The International Realist

Google News is buzzing with articles calling for more examination of the “Israel Lobby” described by Mearsheimer and Walt in the London Review of Books and a Harvard working paper. I want to consider this paper at length in a future article, but will link to relevant stories appearing over the last twenty-four hours now.

• The New York Observer “Mondo Weiss” column by Philip Weiss contains an article titled “Chris Matthews Should Talk About the Israel Lobby Because It’s All He Thinks About.” In it he describes his dream episode of Hardball where Matthews confronts those funding Israeli actions.

• A Gulf News Opinion Column by Duraid Al Baik offers some analysis of the piece as well in the article “US investment in Israel is bad.”

• Antiwar.com has a particularly blunt article on “Israel’s ‘Moral High Ground’” noting how the Israel Lobby responds to any criticism to its morality.

• TPMCafe.com discusses the Mearsheimer and Walt paper along with the article discussed in the “Democrats as Realists?” post a few days ago at “A Presidential Briefing Memo on the Middle East.”

That does it for now. Enjoy the reading.

Technorati Tags: irtheory, mearsheimer, stephenwalt, realism

Sorry about the slow start. There appear to be some technical issues with wordpress.com database. Hopefully it has worked itself out now.

At first glance, realists appear to disregard international organizations choosing power relationships as the true decider in international relations. However, international organizations (IOs) offer an opportunity similar to war in its ability to impose one state’s will on another state.

IOs should not be viewed as power centers or holders–as some would argue NATO is–as states are the only entities that matter in international relations. Rather, IOs should be conceived as forums where states express their interests and power relationships dictate outcomes. For example, when negotiating a draft resolution at the United Nations, the result should be identical to what would have emerged if a “hot” war occurred over the issue. The state with the greater combination of power and national interest on a subject should be able to craft the resolution to best meet its needs. Lesser actors will be less happy with the text, but will not have any deep desire to halt it. The resolution becomes an accurate reflection of reality. Thus, in theory, IOs should emerge as a realist’s playground–power and national interests meshing together to shape the state of international affairs.

However, this potential is often lost in the rhetoric and desire to live up to it. The purpose of the UN should not be to promote democracy or some-such as it feels obliged to proclaim. If the UN, and other IOs, really hoped to become effective at achieving “peace and security,” they would seek to produce “mandates” and resolutions based on the fluid nature of power. Delegations to negotiating sessions should approach them with a realist mindset. Prior to beginning to push a nation’s position, the delegation and its capital need to examine what national interests–in a realist sense–are at stake and what amount of power the state is willing to commit to back up those interests. Only then will IOs reach the potential they have to create “peace and security” in international affairs.

Technorati Tags: irtheory, internationalorganizations, realism

The American Prospect has an article titled “Illusion and Reality” arguing that the Democratic Party should adopt a foreign policy in the Middle East based on “Kissingerian” realism. Flynt Leverett, the author, contends that such a policy would focus less on creating democracies by birthing a new Middle East–as Dr. Rice is fond of saying–and more on supporting states friendly to US interests regardless of governing structure.

Prior to 9/11 and the current Bush Administration’s reworking of Middle East policies, this is how the US operated in the region.  As Leverett notes, “Traditional “allies” like Egypt and Saudi Arabia were also to be fundamentally changed, through U.S.-mandated political transformation. Such transformation would bring a wider range of elites into these countries’ decision making; these elites would be more focused on internal reform and grateful to the United States for their empowerment, which would improve the regional security environment.”  As is quickly becoming apparent, this is destabilizing the region putting US interests (i.e. cheap, dependable oil supply) at risk.

What would a “recovery strategy” look like?  Leverett gives the following framework:

Under current circumstances, a realist strategy for restoring American leadership in the Middle East would include at least five elements:

• The United States needs to widen its approach to defusing the current crisis to include direct engagement with both Syria and Iran. To facilitate a cease-fire and introduction of a multinational force in southern Lebanon, Washington should recognize that Hezbollah’s disarmament would come about only as part of a broader political settlement in the region.

• The United States should convey its interest in a broader strategic dialogue with the al-Assad regime in Damascus, with the aim of re-establishing U.S.-Syrian cooperation on important regional issues and with the promise of significant strategic benefits for Syria clearly on the table.

• Washington should indicate its willingness to pursue a “grand bargain” with Iran, in which the Islamic republic would accept restraints on its nuclear activities and abandon its support for the terrorist activities of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah in return for U.S. commitments not to use force to change Iran’s borders or form of government, to lift unilateral sanctions, and to normalize bilateral relations.

• The United States and key partners should articulate a more substantive vision for a two-state solution to the Palestinian question, including parameters for resolving key final-status issues that would meet the minimum requirements of both sides. This vision should incorporate the Saudi-initiated Arab League peace plan, which offers normalization of Arab states’ relations with Israel to complement peace treaties that end Israel’s occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territory.

• While the United States should engage moderate Arab partners more systematically on economic reform and human rights, Washington should drop its insistence on early resort to open electoral processes as a litmus test for “democratization.”

Let’s hope the Democrats, or at least some wing of the Republican Party, picks this up as we charge toward the midterm elections.

Technorati Tags: henrykissinger, irtheory, realism