The International Realist

In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John Ikenberry(^1) discusses the potential assimilation of China as a great power in the post-WWII “Liberal System” in his article titled “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” He offers a series of policy directions that could encourage China to adopt the rules of international affairs as designed by the West after WWII. The majority of ideas revolve around institutionalizing and codifying the current system while the United States is on top. By adhering to the rules of the system (rather than acting unilaterally) and generating incentives for Chinese involvement, Ikenberry maintains that the United States can create an international order that the Chinese would have/want to accept.

However, Ikenberry fails to describe what, besides normative pressures, will keep a hegemonic China operating within the post-WWII system once it obtains regional hegemony. The United States demonstrated that unilateral policies outside international norms are not punished when committed by the hegemon. Why should China expect the International Community to react differently in its case? If China, or any other nation, becomes a powerful enough hegemon to challenge and change a regional balance of power, will the International Community stop the change? Can it?

If the United States expects China to accept and function within the Liberal System, it needs to reflect relative power-balances. To some extent, it already does, but more work needs to be done. I began developing this idea in the “Realist Playground” from a while back. I will try to develop it further in upcoming posts.

Take home message: Ikenberry gets part-way to the answer. China’s role in the evolving international community needs to be considered, however the United States needs to understand the rules of the game are shifting as it loses its unipolar moment.

Notes:
1. Although I disagree with G. John Ikenberry, he is an amazing scholar. His book, After Victory, helped me make a lot of connections in IR theory during Grad School. To some extent, it is the academic version of the recently-praised Shock Doctrine. Check out a chapter on his website at: http://www.princeton.edu/~gji3/publications.html.

It’s been a little over a year since my last post, but I am now done with Graduate School and feel the need to keep writing about international affairs, even if my job doesn’t require such thought/writing. Thus, I will resurrect this blog in hopes of fulfilling my intellectual needs.

Contrary to expectations when starting this blog, AntiWar.com has a second installment on realist foreign policy being the way to go. In short, the article argues that, in order to offer a different foreign policy than the neoconservatives and Democrats offer, one needs to look at either realism or isolationism. Isolationism being unpractical, the author analyzes realism as a way to foster American interests in the world while avoiding dilemmas like Iraq. Some highlights are below.

Thus, Washington should act to protect and promote U.S. interests. Such a perspective typically characterizes the “realist” school, but there are variants of “realism.” To focus on advancing American objectives does not mean doing everything for anything. It means recognizing that the U.S. has a range of objectives and a range of tools to advance those interests. The means used should be thoughtfully calibrated with the ends sought.
…
Where issues are more vital, Washington can, and sometimes must, do more, including economic sanctions, military threats, and war. But such cases are not common and such steps are not for the faint-hearted. Coercion should be reserved for truly serious and, in the case of military action, vital interests. That is, when America’s territorial integrity, basic liberties, constitutional system, and economic prosperity are at risk.
…
[T]hat is, the U.S. is not entitled to wage aggressive war to lower energy prices, prop up foreign dictators to improve the local investment climate, invade socialist nations to prevent nationalization of corporate assets, train authoritarian security forces to ensure the survival of a U.S.-friendly regime, and so on.

While this is a useful analysis for a way forward in most of the world, there is still no policy prescription regarding the current state of the war in Iraq and terrorism. Now that Iraq is “broken,” it is in the American interest to “fix” it. How best to do that remains a matter of debate (outside of the Whitehouse, that is). That is why the current liberal position, personified by Ned Lamont, demonstrates a lack of intellectual depth. As much as the war in and occupation of Iraq was and is a horrible idea, leaving the country in its current state is an even worse idea. Until the “coalition” and the Iraqis can stabilize the nation’s politics and economy, the actions of the Bush Administration would leave America–and the rest of the world–in a much worse position than prior to the war. Unfortunately, the Democratic (and Republican) Party’s inability to create a plan to secure peace will likely lead to a furtherance of policy that harms US interests regardless of which party controls congress after the mid-term elections.

Technorati Tags: 2006election, iraq, antiwar.com, realism

Google News is buzzing with articles calling for more examination of the “Israel Lobby” described by Mearsheimer and Walt in the London Review of Books and a Harvard working paper. I want to consider this paper at length in a future article, but will link to relevant stories appearing over the last twenty-four hours now.

• The New York Observer “Mondo Weiss” column by Philip Weiss contains an article titled “Chris Matthews Should Talk About the Israel Lobby Because It’s All He Thinks About.” In it he describes his dream episode of Hardball where Matthews confronts those funding Israeli actions.

• A Gulf News Opinion Column by Duraid Al Baik offers some analysis of the piece as well in the article “US investment in Israel is bad.”

• Antiwar.com has a particularly blunt article on “Israel’s ‘Moral High Ground’” noting how the Israel Lobby responds to any criticism to its morality.

• TPMCafe.com discusses the Mearsheimer and Walt paper along with the article discussed in the “Democrats as Realists?” post a few days ago at “A Presidential Briefing Memo on the Middle East.”

That does it for now. Enjoy the reading.

Technorati Tags: irtheory, mearsheimer, stephenwalt, realism

Sorry about the slow start. There appear to be some technical issues with wordpress.com database. Hopefully it has worked itself out now.

At first glance, realists appear to disregard international organizations choosing power relationships as the true decider in international relations. However, international organizations (IOs) offer an opportunity similar to war in its ability to impose one state’s will on another state.

IOs should not be viewed as power centers or holders–as some would argue NATO is–as states are the only entities that matter in international relations. Rather, IOs should be conceived as forums where states express their interests and power relationships dictate outcomes. For example, when negotiating a draft resolution at the United Nations, the result should be identical to what would have emerged if a “hot” war occurred over the issue. The state with the greater combination of power and national interest on a subject should be able to craft the resolution to best meet its needs. Lesser actors will be less happy with the text, but will not have any deep desire to halt it. The resolution becomes an accurate reflection of reality. Thus, in theory, IOs should emerge as a realist’s playground–power and national interests meshing together to shape the state of international affairs.

However, this potential is often lost in the rhetoric and desire to live up to it. The purpose of the UN should not be to promote democracy or some-such as it feels obliged to proclaim. If the UN, and other IOs, really hoped to become effective at achieving “peace and security,” they would seek to produce “mandates” and resolutions based on the fluid nature of power. Delegations to negotiating sessions should approach them with a realist mindset. Prior to beginning to push a nation’s position, the delegation and its capital need to examine what national interests–in a realist sense–are at stake and what amount of power the state is willing to commit to back up those interests. Only then will IOs reach the potential they have to create “peace and security” in international affairs.

Technorati Tags: irtheory, internationalorganizations, realism

The American Prospect has an article titled “Illusion and Reality” arguing that the Democratic Party should adopt a foreign policy in the Middle East based on “Kissingerian” realism. Flynt Leverett, the author, contends that such a policy would focus less on creating democracies by birthing a new Middle East–as Dr. Rice is fond of saying–and more on supporting states friendly to US interests regardless of governing structure.

Prior to 9/11 and the current Bush Administration’s reworking of Middle East policies, this is how the US operated in the region.  As Leverett notes, “Traditional “allies” like Egypt and Saudi Arabia were also to be fundamentally changed, through U.S.-mandated political transformation. Such transformation would bring a wider range of elites into these countries’ decision making; these elites would be more focused on internal reform and grateful to the United States for their empowerment, which would improve the regional security environment.”  As is quickly becoming apparent, this is destabilizing the region putting US interests (i.e. cheap, dependable oil supply) at risk.

What would a “recovery strategy” look like?  Leverett gives the following framework:

Under current circumstances, a realist strategy for restoring American leadership in the Middle East would include at least five elements:

• The United States needs to widen its approach to defusing the current crisis to include direct engagement with both Syria and Iran. To facilitate a cease-fire and introduction of a multinational force in southern Lebanon, Washington should recognize that Hezbollah’s disarmament would come about only as part of a broader political settlement in the region.

• The United States should convey its interest in a broader strategic dialogue with the al-Assad regime in Damascus, with the aim of re-establishing U.S.-Syrian cooperation on important regional issues and with the promise of significant strategic benefits for Syria clearly on the table.

• Washington should indicate its willingness to pursue a “grand bargain” with Iran, in which the Islamic republic would accept restraints on its nuclear activities and abandon its support for the terrorist activities of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah in return for U.S. commitments not to use force to change Iran’s borders or form of government, to lift unilateral sanctions, and to normalize bilateral relations.

• The United States and key partners should articulate a more substantive vision for a two-state solution to the Palestinian question, including parameters for resolving key final-status issues that would meet the minimum requirements of both sides. This vision should incorporate the Saudi-initiated Arab League peace plan, which offers normalization of Arab states’ relations with Israel to complement peace treaties that end Israel’s occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territory.

• While the United States should engage moderate Arab partners more systematically on economic reform and human rights, Washington should drop its insistence on early resort to open electoral processes as a litmus test for “democratization.”

Let’s hope the Democrats, or at least some wing of the Republican Party, picks this up as we charge toward the midterm elections.

Technorati Tags: henrykissinger, irtheory, realism